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Distracting the masses:
Art, local government and freedom of
political speech in Australia
Katharine Gelber
Introduction
Visual images in the form of politically explicit street art can evoke
passionate responses. In the arena of political culture these responses
can be educative or vilificatory, constructive or abusive, and form part
of public debate. Where these images are censored, restricted or banned
through legal intervention by government, however, the debate takes
on a different tone because it interacts with free speech1 principles.
What are the limitations of valid government intervention against
controversial political art? Is it justifiable, and if so when and under
what circumstances, for government to censor political views with
which it disagrees or which it may consider hurtful or offensive to
members of the community within which the art is exhibited? What
are the limits to legal regulation of politically controversial works of
visual culture?
This article deals with some aspects of this debate by considering
an incident of censorship of political art that occurred in November
2004 in the western suburbs of Sydney, Australia. A commissioned
work by Sydney artist Zanny Begg was removed from public display
by a local government. This paper examines this event in four parts.
First, it considers debate around whether and how local government
might have a particular role to play in the promotion or restriction of
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civil liberties and freedoms. Secondly, the events surrounding the
removal of Begg’s artworks are outlined. Thirdly, the context within
which this event took place, namely mechanisms for the protection of
(especially ‘political’) speech in Australia are outlined, as Australia
unusually lacks an explicit constitutional or statutory free speech
protection and this arguably renders freedom of speech particularly
vulnerable to incursion by local government powers. In the next section
of the paper analysis is undertaken regarding the legal and cultural
mechanisms utilised in this incident, and what they demonstrate about
political culture, free speech and local government powers in Australia.
The article concludes that taking both the requirements of contemporary
local governance and the importance of freedom of political speech
seriously requires that local governments be cognisant of, and exercise,
self-restraint in terms of their regulatory capacities. In the incident
described here, the opposite occurred.

The role of local government
Referred to as the ‘bottom tier’ of government (Chapman & Wood
1984: 11), local government in Australia is often regarded as much
less important than the State2 and federal tiers enshrined in the Australian
system of government. 3 State governments possess residual
constitutional powers over areas as diverse as health, primary and
secondary education, roads and economic development. The federal
government’s specified constitutional powers include taxation, welfare
and defence. State and federal governments share concurrent powers
in a range of policy areas including health and housing, often linked
with funding arrangements.
Local government, by contrast, does not derive its powers from the
Australian Constitution but rather is a statutory creation of State
governments. Its numerous entities are created (and can be merged or
split to create new entities) by State parliaments, which grant them —
and thus simultaneously delimit — their powers. Two referenda
attempting to give constitutional recognition to local governments
failed, one in 1974 in which only one State voted in favour of the
proposal (Chapman & Wood 1984: 175), and a second in 1988 in which
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less than one-third of Australians voted in favour of the proposal (Jones
1989: 2, 143).4 There are approximately 809 local governments
nationally.5
Historically, local government in Australia has tended to deal
primarily with service provision in areas of local concern including
regulating land and housing developments, cleaning streets and
maintaining local footpaths, administering household rubbish and
recycling, and providing local community services including
recreational and child care facilities. However, the last two decades
have seen a shift in government practices from ‘government’ to
‘governance’. As part of a general embrace in industrialised societies
of neo-liberal principles, local governments have become increasingly
committed to partnerships with non-government actors for service
provision, policy innovation and community consultation (O’Toole &
Burdess 2005: 241).
As part of this shift large-scale amalgamations have occurred both
within Australia and internationally, leading some studies of local
government to question how local governments can remain, or be
perceived to remain, relevant and important in the Australian system
of government and not be abolished (Jones 1993: 18). The question
has been raised of whether local government provides the best
opportunity for grass roots representation and involvement in decision
making of all the tiers of government, and therefore that it ought to
make the best of its ‘closeness with the people’ by emphasising
participation and thus promoting ‘localism’, defined as ‘the desire for
local communities to influence their choices and control as much as
possible of their own affairs’ (Jones 1993: 18).
This closeness with the people could imply that local government
has a particular role to play in promoting democracy at the local level.
This can happen via the increased promotion of citizen participation in
its decision making processes in order to enhance governments’
responsiveness to local needs and issues (Jones 1981: 199, 235). Jones
argues local government is in a unique position to ‘train’ people in
forms of democratic participation. In doing so, it has the capacity to
promote a version of the ‘good life’, a ‘positive’ form of liberty in
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which citizens may be assisted by government to take command of
their own lives (1989: 18). This is a kind of citizenship-in-government
idea; that through participating in their own governance, citizens
enhance their own capacities to govern themselves to a greater degree
than otherwise possible.
At the same time, it is argued that local government ought to be
mindful of its particular responsibilities regarding what I will call
‘citizenship-against-government’. This is the idea that local government
has the responsibility to develop and enforce a wide range of regulations
governing citizen behaviour, regulations which have a tendency to
prioritise bureaucratic control. It thus has the power to limit individual
liberty in meaningful, important and wide-ranging ways (Jones
1989: 18). It is responsible for many detailed regulations which
‘constrain and inhibit public participation’ in political affairs outside
of government processes (Jones 1981: 235). Jones argues local
government must therefore consciously restrain its own capacity for
regulation (1989: 19).
In the past it had been argued that local government’s importance
does not lie in its closer connection with the grass roots, or its inherent
and unique democratic tendencies, and that there was little evidence
that local government is inherently more suited to, or active in,
promoting citizenship involvement in decision making. For example,
a 1967 survey of local government activities in the United Kingdom
concluded, ‘we have found no evidence to support the common belief
that our local government has some uniquely democratic content’,
expressed either in terms of voter turnout or citizen involvement in
decision making (Committee on the Management of Local Government
(HMSO) cited in Purdie 1976: 25). A 1976 study of Australian local
governments drew similar conclusions, based on a lack of
representativeness on Councils, low participation of women and thenexisting property qualifications on voting (Purdie 1976: 25–36).
However in the context of contemporary understandings of local
governments’ role, significant and far-reaching changes to their
governance practices have occurred. Local governments are
increasingly exploring methods of enhancing community consultation
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and participation in decision making processes (O’Toole & Burdess
2005: 252, Cuthill 2001, Bradshaw 2001, Peel & Pearce 1999, Bishop
& Davis 2002, Wallis & Dollery 2002). Broader reforms have resulted
in the greater involvement of the private sector, non-government
organisations, and community groups and networks in local government
decision-making (Geddes 2005: 18). This shift has been embraced both
by communitarians who see it as a way of reinvigorating collective
policy-making processes, and neo-liberals who see it as a remedy for
market failure, drawing on voluntarism to produce better and cheaper
outcomes for communities (O’Toole & Burdess 2005: 241).
Greater community involvement has transformed both the
citizenship-in-government and the citizenship-against-government
conceptions of citizen participation in multifaceted ways. For in
becoming actively engaged, although these citizens may draw upon
governmental resources, they may simultaneously be working against
governmental (local, State and federal) power and decision-making
(Kenny 1994: 85). Local governance grapples with the contradictory
obligations of representing and giving voice to local constituents’
interests, and implementing policies of higher levels of government.
This produces an ‘irresolvability’ in local government power, since
local government is required to express both compliance with the central
authorities from which its mandate derives and support for its local
communities (Woods 1998: 25).
Thus, at the heart of the citizenship-in-government conception is a
complex, inherent, irresolvable, but also potentially constructive
tension. While citizens’ participation may enhance their own ability to
self-govern, and empower them to participate in their own governance,
this can at the same time lead to increasingly differentiated demands
and pressures from those citizens on their local governments. This
tension is potentially constructive because it means that local
governments possess a flexibility in determining their response to
competing demands on them (Woods 1998: 25). This flexibility could
potentially enhance their policy outcomes by allowing them scope to
develop innovative policy choices and to respond in multifaceted ways
to pressure from several directions simultaneously.
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When considered in the context of local governments’ role in the
protection of, or placing of limitations on, important and fundamental
civil liberties this constructive tension is particularly interesting. It
means that it becomes possible to make a normative argument that
local government ought to take its role as a protector of freedom
seriously even though this may require that it see itself as protecting
citizenship-against-government at all levels — including against its
own powers of regulation. To achieve this would require considerable
self-restraint. But such self-restraint becomes possible when the inherent
tension within local governments’ contemporary role is viewed
constructively.
In the realm of civil liberties protection, some evidence exists that
local governments are adopting a self-restraining and liberty-enhancing
role. A formal example occurred in the introduction in 2001 by the
Hume City Council in Victoria of a Social Justice Charter containing
Australia’s inaugural Bill of Rights.6 The current Charter is prefaced
by a message from the Mayor of the City of Hume in which he affirms
the Council’s commitment to social justice ‘founded upon human rights’
and the ‘unique and privileged role’ of the Council in promoting citizen
participation ‘in the life of the City’. The Charter itself aims to ‘promote
an active citzenry’, and recognises that every citizen is ‘free and equal
in dignity and rights’ and ‘entitled to aspire to that quality of life that
allows them to freely realise their potential’. The Bill of Rights
acknowledges that the ‘spirit and vigour’ of human rights’ recognition
and reinforcement lie ‘deep within’ local governments’ domain and in
‘those who participate in the public life of their community’. It also
discusses Council’s plans to initiate a ‘Community Empowerment
Action Plan’.
Other, less formal, examples exist in the increasing citizen
participation referred to above, and in the increasing involvement of
local governments in community development work in which nongovernment actors participate in local decision-making and in so doing
‘build structures that facilitate democratic participation’ (Kenny
1994: 8) and generate active forms of citizenship (Kenny 2004).
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So can local government be a protector of citizens’ freedom, even
if that means protecting its own constituents against its own powers of
regulation, indeed against itself? What kinds of freedoms are envisaged
in a claim that they can or should be so? How would a freedomprotecting local government act? It is to these kinds of questions that
the rest of this article will be addressed. I turn now to a case study to
address these issues.

‘Weapons of Mass Distraction’
In 2004 the Blacktown Arts Centre, which is funded by the Blacktown
City Council,7 and the University of Western Sydney jointly organised
an exhibition entitled ‘[OUT OF GALLERY]: A Series of Guerilla
Exhibitions in Western Sydney’ (Ihlein 2004: 10). Work by Sydney
artist Zanny Begg was selected for the exhibition. It consisted of 10
life-size cutouts of soldiers in military fatigues with the slogan
‘Checkpoint for Weapons of Mass Distraction’. A contract was drawn
up between the Arts Centre and the artist, specifying that her artwork
would be placed in 10 outdoor sites across the local government area
which were to be ‘grey areas’ between public and private space: car
parks, abandoned buildings and so on. The artworks were to be made
out of cardboard and affixed with cable ties so they were removable.
The pieces were to be left in place for the public to do with them what
they wished, including defacing them or taking them down, and the
image to be used was approved (Begg 2005).
On 23 November 2004 Begg had already installed five pieces across
the local government area. She was in the car park of the Blacktown
Arts Centre installing a sixth when a Community Law Enforcement
Officer approached her and told her it was an ‘illegal sign’. Begg denied
it was illegal and suggested that the Officer speak with the Arts Centre.
The Officer went into the Arts Centre, and then returned maintaining
that the artwork was ‘inappropriate’. He said to her, ‘Don’t you know
there’s a war on in Iran?’ Begg replied, ‘That’s Iraq’. The Officer replied,
‘It’s too political. It’s totally inappropriate in the climate of terrorism’
(Begg 2005).
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The Officer then told Begg that the Council had informed the curator
of the exhibition, Mr Adnan Begic, that her work had been removed
from the exhibition and that she had to take her pieces down. The Officer
told her if she did not comply, ‘I’ll take you down to the station and
you’ll be fined’. Begg subsequently contacted the curator of the
exhibition who confirmed that her work had been removed from the
exhibition and told her to take down all her pieces immediately. She
said she disagreed with Begic’s decision and they agreed that they would
meet the next day so that she could show him where the pieces were
and he would take them down, however by then the pieces had already
been removed.
Begg and Begic subsequently held a personal meeting with (initially)
two representatives of the Blacktown Arts Centre and the Blacktown
City Council, which Begg described as ‘hostile’ (Begg 2005). At this
meeting the representatives suggested that the installation of Begg’s
work had caused concern because Begg herself had been wearing army
fatigues while installing the work (which was untrue, as a photo in the
local media testified), and that she had also been using a toy gun (which
was also untrue). They said this had led to federal counter-terrorism
authorities being called8 and members of Council being questioned
about her behaviour on the streets of the local government area. During
the meeting a third and more senior representative arrived who was
less hostile to Begg and Begic. She acknowledged that there had been
a misunderstanding on the part of Council regarding Begg’s behaviour
on the day of the installation.9
In a subsequent interview, Blacktown Arts Centre and Council
representatives were at pains to state Council’s position that the artwork
had not been ‘censored’ or ‘cancelled’ but rather that a ‘temporary
pause’ had been placed on the exhibition of the works. When asked to
clarify the difference, the representatives stated that Begg had placed
her artworks in public areas two days before the scheduled installation
date and that this had caused problems because final approvals from
sites where the artworks were to be placed had not yet been secured.
After the artworks were cancelled, however, subsequent approval was
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not sought and no further effort was made to permit installation of the
artworks (BAC/BCC 2006). Thus, the ‘pause’ was never lifted.
Begg subsequently received an email from Council informing her
that one of her artworks had been impounded and she was being fined
for placement of an ‘illegal sign’, in the amount of $410.30. No further
detail was provided. She argued in response that the artwork had been
installed as a work commissioned by the Blacktown Arts Centre, which
is funded by the Council, and that the artwork could therefore not be
considered an ‘illegal sign’. The fine was rescinded (Ihlein 2004: 11).
Begg made several subsequent attempts to get more detailed
information from the Council regarding the grounds on which the
decision to cancel her work was made, but consistently received no
response. Begic left the Blacktown Arts Centre, citing interference by
Council in its curatorial decisions (Begg 2005). It was subsequently
reported in a newspaper article in February 2005 that staff had left the
Arts Centre due to a pattern of mayoral interference and censorship,
although in interview representatives of the Blacktown Arts Centre
denied that any such pattern exists (BAC/BCC 2006). It was also
reported that Mayor Leo Kelly had said the artwork ‘discredited the
Council’ and that he had refused to explain further the Council’s decision
regarding Begg’s work (Sun Herald 6 February 2005: 40). Following
publication of this article, minutes of the Ordinary Meeting of
Blacktown City Council on 9 February 2005 show under ‘Business
Without Notice’ that ‘allegations in a newspaper article’ in relation to
interference in the direction of the Blacktown Arts Centre were raised.
They show that ‘following advice from the Mayor’ this item was not
proceeded with any further.10
In another media report a Council spokesperson was quoted as
saying the artwork had been classed as ‘street entertainment’ which
required a permit to show (Daily Telegraph 24 November 2004: 22)
however the email sent to Begg, the only written evidence of Council’s
decision, had cited an ‘illegal sign’. The Mayor of Blacktown City
Council featured in another media report in which he said, ‘This sort
of thing in the name of art is not going to go on in our city’ (The Glebe
9 December 2004: 1, 8).
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In February 2005 Begg held a new exhibition with the support of
the Mori Gallery in inner-city Sydney. This exhibition was entitled
‘Checkpoint’ and displayed 100 pieces which were the same as in the
first exhibition — cardboard cutouts dressed in fatigues, carrying rifles
and tagged with the text ‘Checkpoints for Weapons of Mass Distraction’.
They filled the gallery and spilled out onto the sidewalk. The exhibition
also featured A3-size political placards produced by other artists (Sydney
Morning Herald 4 February 2005: 26). The exhibition proceeded
without incident, and the exhibition brochure contained articles critical
of the controversy authored by academics and other artists, as well as
a letter of protest sent at the time of the incident to Blacktown City
Council and signed by 102 supporters.
Having established the empirical evidence surrounding the removal
of Begg’s work, and before drawing analytical conclusions regarding
the Council’s actions in this incident, it is appropriate now to move to
a consideration of the broader frameworks of freedom (or otherwise)
of speech in Australia, to locate this incident within a broader free
speech perspective.

Freedom of political speech
and government self-restraint
Freedom of speech is a fundamental (but not absolute) political liberty
recognised in liberal democratic nation-states all over the world and
enshrined both in international human rights standards (such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 19) and
domestic constitutional or statutory law in many countries (eg the First
Amendment to the USA Constitution, Art 16 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, Art 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, and Schedule 1, Art 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)).
It is a freedom widely recognised in scholarly literature as important,
an importance which is justified on the basis that it promotes the search
for truth, participatory democratic practice, individual self-development,
or is a deontologically conceived ‘right’ (Barendt 1985: 8–23, Schauer
1982).
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Historically, Australia has lacked an explicit constitutional or
statutory free speech right,11 and for most of Australia’s post settlement
history a combination of common law and responsible government
have been the methods used to preserve and protect free speech
(Williams 2002: 25). Thus, free speech in Australia has been an intrinsic
and implicit, but often not very visible, component of political and
legal culture. The visibility of free speech protections has been
augmented since 1992 by an emerging but limited High Court
jurisprudence on freedom of political communication.12 Michael
Chesterman outlines how free speech has been recognised as an
important component of Australian law over time and that the High
Court has referred to, and relied upon, a common law tradition in
outlining the parameters of its emerging constitutional doctrine
(2000a: 6–7).
The implied constitutional freedom of political communication is
limited in its scope, conception and application in important ways. The
freedom is regarded as an implication from the form of representative
and responsible government established by the Australian Constitution.
It is therefore derived from the text and structure of the Constitution
and not extrinsically as an individual ‘right’, and it operates as a freedom
from government restraint rather than a right conferred on individuals
(Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation at 566–7, Gelber
2003: 23–32, Patapan 2000: 51–9, Williams 2002: 165–97, Stone 1998,
2001). It is further limited to ‘political communication’, usually
understood as discussions relating to matters that have a bearing on
federal politics (Lange at 571–2, see also Chesterman 2000b). This
relatively narrow definition of political speech prevailed in 2005 in
APLA v Legal Services Commissioner in which it was argued that a
connection with the activities of the legislature and/or executive was
required.13 The comment on the war in Iraq made by Begg’s artwork
ought thus to be able to be considered ‘political communication’ since
Australia’s involvement arises from a decision of the executive
government.
Importantly non-verbal expression has been included in the
conception of political communication, as evidenced in Levy v Victoria
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in which protesters entering a duck shooting area were considered to
be engaging in political communication. Thus the fact that Begg’s
artwork constituted non-verbal expression would not remove it from
the purview of the implied freedom’s protection. That Begg’s artwork
can be considered political speech under the terms of the doctrine ought
not to be taken to imply I am subjecting the Begg incident to a test of
whether it ought to be considered protected political communication
under the terms of the constitutional doctrine, but only that it does
constitute political communication even under the narrow definition
of such speech favoured by the High Court of Australia.
Finding that an expression constitutes political expression does not
automatically protect it from infringement by government. Even where
a communication can be determined to be in principle subject to the
protection afforded by the implied freedom of political communication,
the High Court has permitted governmental restrictions where they
occur as a result of a law that is appropriately adapted to achieving
another legitimate government end. In a two-step test first outlined in
the Lange decision, one first questions whether a law does effectively
burden freedom of communication about government or political
matters, and secondly, if the answer to that question is yes, one asks
whether the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a
legitimate government end, compatible with the maintenance of the
constitutionally prescribed system of government.14 If the law is so
appropriate and adapted it may still be held to be a valid exercise of
legislative power, even where it infringes upon freedom of political
speech. Thus, the freedom is able to be overridden where another
legitimate purpose is to be achieved by a speech-restricting government
policy. The fragility of freedom of even political speech within this
framework has been remarked upon by scholars in the field, with
Michael Chesterman describing free speech in Australia as a ‘delicate
plant’ (2000a) and my earlier work describing the freedom as ‘partial
and unsatisfactory’ (Gelber 2003: 44).
Within this general framework it can be argued further that freedom
of political speech in Australia is vulnerable in relation specifically to
the powers of local government. This is so for two intersecting reasons.
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Firstly, protection of political speech has what might be described as a
vulnerable foundation in Australian law. The clearest elucidation that
political speech is an important and protected freedom — the implied
constitutional doctrine — relies upon a negative enforcement
mechanism. That is to say, it is a freedom achieved via restraint on
government.15 It is a freedom reliant for its realisation on legislative
and executive non-interference in the political speech activities of
individuals. Simultaneously, the lack of clear definition of when a law
is reasonably appropriate and adapted to another legitimate government
end and thus a valid exercise of governmental power leaves considerable
scope for restriction on freedom of political speech to occur. This scope
will ultimately rely on the interpretive powers of legislators and
regulators in the first instance, and judges in the second, to be defined.
It has already been argued that the doctrine is losing its importance as
a ‘fetter on legislative and executive actions’ due to restrictive
interpretations of its scope (Lee 2005: 80). Thus, the protection of
political speech which is reliant on restraint (and this assumes also
self-restraint) on the part of government is vulnerable where and when
governments at whatever level may choose not to practise such selfrestraint.
The second and intersecting reason for the particular vulnerability
of freedom of political speech in this context is the manner of operation
of local government powers analysed above. I have argued that in the
realm of civil liberties protection, local government ought to be
particularly mindful that such protection may require it to protect its
constituents against its own, and other levels of governments’,
regulatory powers.
Some evidence already exists that this vulnerability is of more than
theoretical concern. Empirical research of specific case studies has
shown that some local governments, both before and after the
emergence of the implied constitutional freedom, demonstrated
similarities in their preparedness to restrict even the most obviously
political forms of speech in rather heavy-handed ways (Gelber 2003).
An overview of relevant local government regulations in all pedestrian
malls around Australia (defined as former roads that have been
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transformed into open air malls,16 and arguably therefore exemplary
public spaces for such activities) shows that opportunities for exercising
political speech in pedestrian malls are at risk from regulatory provisions
enforced in the context of often hostile politico-cultural attitudes within
local governments. A lack of civic culture within local governments
regarding the importance of political deliberation was identified (Gelber
2005). It is important to note that the results of these earlier studies
were not uniform, and that some local governments were performing
‘well’ in the sense of promoting liberty and being mindful of their
powers in constraining political speech. Yet a significant proportion,
as reported in these studies, was not. The in-depth examination of the
Begg incident undertaken in this paper is intended to add further
evidence and dimension to these conclusions regarding local
government powers.
Having established this context for the kind of role local government
ought to play in political speech protection, I turn now to consider the
grounds on which the Blacktown City Council acted in the Begg
incident.

Text, culture and attitude
The grounds on which the action was taken by the Blacktown City
Council to remove Begg’s artworks are not entirely clear. Nevertheless,
some investigative results are worth reporting. In terms of the legal
powers of Council, the Blacktown Local Environmental Plan (LEP)
defines some types of signs in its interpretive section.17 None of these
signs adequately conceptualises the artwork that was placed in the local
government area by Begg. The closest is a ‘temporary sign’, but this is
defined as one advertising a local event. The term ‘sign’ on its own
does not appear in the interpretive section. The LEP lists specified
types of signs as exempt from a requirement for consent from Council,
subject to compliance with conditions relating to size, number and
placement.18 Temporary signs are listed as exempt from the requirement
for a development application. The spirit, if not the text, of the
regulations appears to be that relatively small-scale community signs
with minimal or no impact on safety or their environment may be placed
without requiring approval from Council at all.
208

Distracting the masses

It was argued by the Blacktown Arts Centre and Council that Begg’s
installation of the works two days prior to the arranged date meant that
final approvals for their placement, which were being negotiated
between the BAC and local sites, had not been granted (BAC/BCC
2006). This gave the Council a ground for temporarily halting the
installation of the artworks until such approval had been secured.
However, three arguments speak against this being the sole reason for
the artworks’ removal. Firstly, if the Council had only wished to secure
final approvals from installation sites, they could have continued to do
so and the installation could have easily taken place two days later on
the scheduled installation date. This did not occur. Once the artworks
had been removed they were not subsequently reinstalled, nor was
approval sought to reinstall the works at any future date. The ‘pause’
in the installation was permanent. Secondly, other comments by Council
members as reported in the media concerning the content and meaning
of the work would have been irrelevant and need not have featured in
the debate at all. Thirdly, the spirit of the regulations as described here
is that small-scale signs with minimal or no impact on safety and the
environment ought to be permitted. Thus in spirit at least and given the
size and positioning of the artworks, the possible removal of the
artworks for the regulatory purpose of securing public safety seems
spurious.
Looking again at the spirit as well as the letter of the regulations,
the only two types of ‘signs’ defined in the interpretive section which
explicitly do not attract exemptions from a requirement to obtain consent
from Council to place are illuminated street signs and pole or pylon
signs, structures which require considerable effort to place and which
have a significant impact on their immediate environment. Furthermore,
the Blacktown Development Control Plan 1992 (DCP) which provides
further detail for the LEP specifies19 that the Local Approvals Policy
provides a mechanism for applying for approval for the placement of a
‘sign’. These procedures derive from the State government’s State
Environmental Planning Policy No 64: Advertising and Signage,20 and
go through the building section of the Council. They refer to signs
which have significant implications for traffic flow or visibility or are
likely to have some other significant impact on the area in which they
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are placed. These provisions are intended to grant State and local
governments control over large-scale signs, and/or signs likely to have
a significant environmental or safety impact when they are placed.
Clearly, Begg’s artwork did not fit within these categories or
conceptions.
In the context of its regulatory framework, Blacktown Arts Centre
and Council representatives were unable to explain why Begg was not
invited two days later to reinstall her artworks under the original terms
of the contract. They also suggested that the reason the Council Officer
who had initially expressed such hostility to the works acted in the
manner he did is that he did not know about the exhibition being
installed (BAC/BCC 2006). If this oversight were true, it again could
have been easily remedied and Begg could have been invited to reinstall
her works on the scheduled day.
This implies that the strictly legal status of the artworks was not the
sole or primary issue in their initial and ongoing removal, and that
cultural or attitudinal issues came into play in this incident. As already
noted, the Mayor indicated publicly that he believed the artwork
‘discredited the Council’ and the Community Law Enforcement Officer
saw the artwork as ‘inappropriate’, but clarification of both these
statements remains elusive. During Begg’s meeting with local
government representatives, other elements they described as leading
to the artwork’s cancellation (Begg’s clothing and use of a toy gun)
were admitted to be untrue. Such a lack of clarity regarding the grounds
for the artworks’ removal requires one to speculate as to the reasons
why the artwork may have caused such discomfort on the part of the
Council.
At first glance, two possible reasons arise. The first is that the
Community Law Enforcement Officer misread the text accompanying
the cutouts. Instead of ‘Weapons of Mass Distraction’, perhaps they
read it as ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. This interpretation is bolstered
by the Officer’s comment to Begg during discussions about the war in
‘Iran’. Precision of expression did not feature during this emotionally
charged exchange. However, even if this were true this does not in and
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of itself explain why the artworks were removed and no effort made to
secure their subsequent exhibition. Even had the text read, ‘Weapons
of Mass Destruction’, given that they were placed on cutouts of Western
soldiers dressed in fatigues and carrying rifles, this would have implied
that Western soldiers were themselves weapons of mass destruction.
This could be regarded as a controversial statement at a time when
Australian soldiers were engaged in fighting in Iraq. But it does not in
and of itself justify removal of the artworks unless we accept that the
Council has the power to remove political statements either which it
finds controversial or with which it disagrees.
A second possible reason for Council’s reaction is that it was
expressing concern for its constituents. Blacktown, the most populous
City in New South Wales, is culturally diverse. It has residents from
over 50 countries who speak 63 different languages and in the period
August 1991 to February 1996, 96 per cent of new arrivals were from
a non-English speaking background (BCC 2005). Perhaps these
demographics made the Council more sensitive to criticisms of war in
Iraq. However these issues were not cited by Council representatives
when or after they took action to remove the artworks from exhibition.
Moreover, one could also argue in the obverse that the demographic
profile of the Council’s constituents would increase the popularity of
and support for public artworks critical of the war in Iraq.
Thus neither of these explanations appears convincing, nor does
either of them explain how the artworks could have ‘discredited’ the
Council. This raises the possibility that the Council removed the
artworks with the intention of closing down the debate such a political
piece of public art could provoke. The local government in question
chose to shut down public discussion of a critical contemporary political
issue — the war on terrorism. A regulatory environment designed to
grant local government the power to control the placement of advertising
signs was used to achieve this outcome, which seems an extraordinarily
misplaced use of the regulation. The incident displayed an attitude that
an appropriate (re)action from Council to a political expression which
it did not want to hear was to remove it from public display. More
specifically, this incident demonstrated an attitude on the part of this
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local government that political discussion on a controversial issue ought
to be shut down, rather than facilitated.
This analysis demonstrates that the fate of political speech can be
poor in local government environments, based just as much on politicocultural attitudes towards political speech as on the textual legal
environment. Moreover, the lack of any demonstrable reconsideration
on the part of Council indicates that the original decision to remove
the artwork was not regarded as important to overturn within Council
ranks, and that the poor fate of freedom of political speech in this
instance was not regarded problematically.

Local government and citizenship
I argued earlier that citizens’ participation in local government activities
can both enhance citizens’ participation in their own self-governance
and at the same time lead to tensions where those participatory practices
simultaneously challenge governmental power. I argued further that
local governments could and should see this dilemma in constructive
terms. That is to say, in being forced to confront the scope of their own
regulatory capacities, and in the context of the protection of a
fundamental liberty such as freedom of political speech, local
governments could use such opportunities to develop innovative
governance practices that meet the demands both of governing and of
their constituents. If they were to do so they could enhance both the
citizenship-in-government and citizenship-against-government
capacities inherent in their contemporary role.
The Begg incident demonstrates, firstly, that such constructive
tensions do manifest. A member of the community participated in a
Council-funded arts initiative and in so doing, she and the Blacktown
Arts Centre utilised Council resources. When the exhibition took place
some Council authorities including the Mayor expressed disfavour for
the work. They then utilised their regulatory powers to remove the
artworks in question. Secondly, the Council’s oversight of the Arts
Centre’s activities generally combined with its actions in the Begg
incident imply a preparedness on the part of Council to utilise its
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regulatory frameworks despite overt disagreement from affected
constituents, a contextual background of the importance of freedom of
political communication, and open media criticism.
Thus, thirdly, although the Council was forced to confront the scope
of its own regulatory capacities in the context of a freedom of political
speech issue, its chosen response was to close down debate rather than
to facilitate it, to adopt a censorious rather than a constructive policy,
and to obscure rather than to clarify its reasons for doing so. In local
governance terms the Begg incident demonstrates the failure of the
Blacktown City Council to meet the demands both of governance, to
the extent that preservation of the fundamental liberty of freedom of
political speech is regarded as a demand of governance, and of (a section
of) its active citizens who sought to mount a public exhibition of
artwork, some of which deliberately raised controversial political
themes.
Fourthly, in a context in which freedom of political speech is reliant
on government self-restraint to be realised, the Blacktown City Council
demonstrated a failure to be cognisant of what could be regarded as
appropriate limits to its own regulatory capacities, given its failure to
facilitate reinstallation of the works subsequently to their initial removal
if purely administrative issues had been the justification for their
removal in the first place. That reinstallation did not occur implies that
other, non-administrative, reasons existed for removal of the artworks.
This renders Council’s reasoning obscure and inappropriate in this
instance given the normal requirements of local governance. Of course,
this is not the only example of governance practices entered into by
the Blacktown City Council and I am not attempting to draw general
conclusions about a range of Council practices or attitudes from one
incident. Indeed in interview local government representatives stressed
that Blacktown City Council sponsors a range of arts and cultural
development activities, many of which could be seen as controversial,
and that Council is proud of its achievements in that area (BAC/BCC
2006). I am arguing, however, that for the reasons outlined here this
incident ought to be regarded seriously in the context of the importance
of freedom of political speech and local government powers.
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Alternative governance practices would have been possible in this
incident; a freedom-enhancing local government could have taken a
different role. It could have left the artworks alone in the first place,
for citizens to deal with as they wished individually and in ways the
artist had intended and hoped for. It could have arranged reinstallation
of the artworks two days after they were first removed and in accordance
with the original arrangements. It could have seen the artworks as an
opportunity to have an open discussion within the community about
the war on terrorism, by holding public events or conducting further
community consultation. It could even have seen the event as an
opportunity to demonstrate to its constituents its commitment to the
very freedoms the war on terror is purporting to preserve — democracy,
free speech, and the ability of citizens to engage in political expression
simultaneously critical of government and free from government
restraint. Instead, it chose to do the opposite.

Notes
I would like to thank Zanny Begg for sharing her story with me for this
article, for permission to use this image, and for her artwork from which
the title of this article has been drawn. I would also like to thank the journal’s
anonymous referees and Sarah Maddison for very helpful comments on
the draft.
1

The terms ‘speech’ and ‘communication’ (in the context of ‘free speech’
and ‘freedom of political speech/communication’) will be used
interchangeably in this article and are intended to include deliberately
expressive non-verbal forms of expression, such as visual images and
artworks.

2

In order to avoid confusion, in this article the term ‘State’ (with a capital
‘S’) will be used to denote the sub-national level of government in Australia.

3

Most general analyses of Australian politics and federalism either omit
local government from consideration (eg Brett et al 1994), or provide only
marginal analysis of the range of powers of this level of government (eg
Singleton et al 2003 provides two pages at 90–2).

4

In Australia the text of the Constitution may only be changed via a national
referendum, which requires both a majority of voters and a majority of
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States to vote in favour in order to pass. Referenda have a high failure rate,
with only 8 out of 44 passed since Federation (Vromen & Gelber 2005: 80).
5

Precise figures on the numbers of local governments differ according to
their inclusion or exclusion of forms of indigenous community
representation. In 1978 Power et al cited 866 (1981: 25), in 1992 Jones
cited 913 including indigenous community councils (1993: 5), and in 1997
McNeill cited 809 local governments plus a further 112 community
governments (1997: 17). See also information on the reductions between
1971 and 1980 in Chapman & Wood (1984: 38). The focus of this article is
on mainstream ‘local governments’ and not indigenous community
representative forms.

6

The Charter is regularly updated. See text of the 2004 Charter and Bill of
Rights at <www.hume.vic.gov.au/Page/page.asp?Page_Id=298&h=
1#BM1109> accessed 15 March 2006, copy on file with author.

7

See general information at <www.blacktown.nsw.gov.au/residents/venues/
blacktown-arts-centre.cfm> accessed 15 March 2006.

8

There is no evidence that, even if such a call was made, any action resulted
or that counter-terrorism authorities regarded the incident as in any way
significant. Begg was not contacted by counter-terrorism authorities, and
this claim did not feature in any subsequent negotiations between Begg
and the Council.

9

In interview, representatives of the Blacktown Arts Centre clarified that on
the morning on which Begg had installed her works, a Council officer had
reported a separate incident in which an unidentified member of the public
had motioned with their hands in pretence at ‘shooting’ the Council officer.
They argued this contributed to an atmosphere of ‘heightened security
awareness’. It was clearly understood by the time this meeting with Begg
had occurred that Begg had not been the person in question (BAC/BCC
2006).

10 Minutes of the Ordinary Meeting of Blacktown City Council, 9 February
2005: 18. Copy on file with author. Scrutiny of the minutes of other Ordinary
Council meetings during the 12-month period following the removal of
Begg’s artworks shows no other mention of the incident.
11 With the exception of the recently enacted and limited jurisdiction of s16
of the Australian Capital Territory’s Human Rights Act 2004 and s15 of the
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) .
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12 The two landmark cases that outlined the freedom were Nationwide News
Pty Ltd v Wills and Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth. A
unanimous judgment in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation
clarified the freedom.
13 APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) at 421 (per McHugh J)
and 519 (per Callinan J).
14 This is known as the ‘Lange test’ and is derived from the unanimous
judgment in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation at 567–8. This
test was reaffirmed in Coleman v Power at 207–8, and APLA Ltd v Legal
Services Commissioner (NSW) at 456.
15 ‘Within our legal system, communications are free only to the extent that
they are left unburdened by laws that comply with the Constitution’: Lange
at 567.
16 This is contrasted to the private space constituted by ‘shopping malls’ —
enclosed buildings erected for the purpose of promoting commercial
transactions. Shopping malls were not included in the study.
17 Blacktown Local Environmental Plan 1988, Part 1: Preliminary, s6(1)
Interpretation, pp 21–36. These are an awning sign, a business identification
sign, a fascia sign, a fin sign, a flush wall sign, an illuminated street sign,
a painted wall sign, a pole or pylon sign, a projecting wall sign, a real
estate sign, a school sign, a temporary sign (defined as one advertising a
local event and displayed no more than 14 days before the event is to take
place), a top hamper sign, an under awning sign and a window sign.
18 Blacktown Local Environmental Plan 1988, Part 3, Schedule 6: Exempt
Development, pp 98–9. These are awning and under awning signs, business
identification signs, fascia signs, fin or projecting wall signs, flush or painted
wall signs, real estate signs, school signs, temporary signs (as defined
above), top hamper signs or window signs.
19 Blacktown Development Control Plan 1992, Part D: Development in the
Business Zones, s4: General Guidelines for Development, subsection 4.9:
Signs.
20 According to the NSW government web site, ‘State environmental planning
policies (SEPPs) deal with issues significant to the state and people of
New South Wales’: <www.planning.nsw.gov.au/asp/sepp.asp?where=sepp>
accessed 15 March 2006. The assessment criteria to which signs are
subjected under these procedures appear in Schedule 1 of the SEPP.
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